Security Architecture

Breeze is an RMM platform — it has privileged access to every device it manages. Security is not a feature bolted on after the fact; it is foundational to every layer of the architecture. This document describes the security controls, practices, and design decisions in Breeze. It is intended for MSPs evaluating Breeze, security teams conducting assessments, and contributors building on the platform.

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Defense-in-Depth

Every request passes through multiple security layers before reaching application logic. No single layer is relied upon in isolation.

Layer	Control
Transport	TLS 1.2+ with HSTS preload
Origin	CORS strict allowlist (no wildcards in production)
Content	Content Security Policy (CSP)
CSRF	Header-based validation on state-changing requests
Rate Limiting	Redis sliding window with in-memory fallback (100K entry cap)
Authentication	JWT + MFA + session tokens
Authorization	RBAC with permission middleware
Tenant Isolation	PostgreSQL row-level security (enabled + forced) under an unprivileged DB role, plus app-layer site-scope enforcement
Audit	Structured event logging on all security-relevant actions
Encryption at Rest	AES-256-GCM for secrets, Argon2id for passwords

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Authentication

User Authentication

Breeze implements multi-factor authentication with defense-in-depth:

Control	Implementation
Password hashing	Argon2id — 64 MB memory, 3 iterations, 4 threads
Password policy	8–128 chars, mixed case, numeric required
Access tokens	JWT (HS256), 15-minute lifetime, audience/issuer-scoped
Refresh tokens	JWT, 7-day lifetime, unique JTI, revocable
Session tokens	Cryptographically random (nanoid 48), SHA-256 hashed in DB
MFA	TOTP (RFC 6238), 10 recovery codes (XXXX-XXXX format)
SMS MFA	Optional Twilio integration for SMS-based codes
Passkey MFA	WebAuthn/FIDO2 (@simplewebauthn/server) — phishing-resistant platform authenticators and security keys; per-credential signature counter for clone detection. Enrolment requires a current-password step-up.
Token revocation	Explicit session invalidation, bulk logout per user; refresh-token family reuse detection (a replayed rotated token revokes the entire family)

Plaintext tokens are never stored. All token storage uses SHA-256 hashes.

API Key Authentication

API keys follow the same security model as agent tokens:

• Format: brz_ prefix for identification
• Storage: SHA-256 hash only — the plaintext key is shown once at creation, never again
• Scoping: JSONB scope array with wildcard support (* for full access)
• Lifecycle: Configurable expiration, revocable, status tracking (active/revoked/expired)
• Rate limiting: Per-key configurable request limits
• Audit trail: lastUsedAt timestamp and usageCount updated on every use

Agent Authentication

Agents authenticate using brz_-prefixed tokens issued during enrollment. The token is SHA-256 hashed and stored in devices.agentTokenHash — the plaintext is never persisted server-side. Every REST request and WebSocket connection validates the bearer token against the stored hash. Decommissioned and quarantined devices are rejected with 403.

For organizations requiring proof-of-possession at the TLS layer, optional Cloudflare mTLS adds certificate-based mutual authentication.

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Authorization and Multi-Tenancy

Tenant Hierarchy

Partner (MSP) → Organization (Customer) → Site (Location) → Device Group → Device

Every entity is scoped to this hierarchy. A user at one organization can never access another organization’s data — this is enforced at the database layer, not just the application layer.

Database-Level Tenant Isolation

The API connects to PostgreSQL as an unprivileged role (breeze_app) — never as the database owner or a superuser. Every tenant-scoped table has row-level security enabled and FORCED, with policies that constrain visibility to the caller’s tenant. Because RLS is forced, the policies apply even to the table owner; a SQL-injection foothold or a logic bug in a single query cannot read or write across tenants, because the database itself rejects out-of-tenant rows.

Tenant context is supplied per request through PostgreSQL session variables:

breeze.scope             = 'system' | 'partner' | 'organization'
breeze.org_id            = UUID of current organization
breeze.accessible_org_ids = comma-separated list or '*'

These variables are set via set_config() within the request transaction context using Node.js AsyncLocalStorage. Queries that don’t have proper context set will fail — there is no default permissive state, and the bare connection pool is forbidden in request code.

Coverage is enforced mechanically: a contract test asserts that every tenant-scoped table carries the correct RLS policy shape, so a new table cannot ship without isolation. Cross-tenant writes are additionally validated by forging an out-of-tenant insert as breeze_app and confirming PostgreSQL rejects it with a row-level-security violation.

Role-Based Access Control

Component	Description
Roles	Named definitions scoped to system, partner, or organization level
Permissions	Atomic resource:action pairs (e.g., devices:read, scripts:execute)
Wildcards	*:* grants all permissions (system admin only)
Middleware	requirePermission(resource, action) enforced on every protected route
Caching	5-minute in-memory permission cache to reduce DB lookups

Scope Enforcement

Three scope levels control data visibility:

• System: Full access to all organizations (super-admin only)
• Partner: MSP access to their portfolio, configurable per-org (all, selected, none)
• Organization: Single-tenant access, no cross-org visibility

Scope is computed once per request via resolveOrgAccess() and applied to all downstream queries.

Site-Scope Enforcement

Organization users can be restricted to specific sites (via organization_users.site_ids). Site is a sub-organization authorization axis that is not covered by PostgreSQL RLS — it is enforced in the application layer, layered above org-level row-level security. The caller’s allowed site set is resolved once during auth middleware into a canAccessSite() closure that every device-acting path consults before doing work.

A site-restricted technician is gated on every path that acts on a device:

• Device mutations — device PATCH, including moving a device to a new site (the target site is checked).
• Script execution — the device’s site is verified before scripts are listed or run.
• Automations — create, update, and manual trigger reject any automation whose resolved target set escapes the caller’s allowed sites (no unbounded org-wide automations for site-restricted users).
• Playbooks — execution and execution updates verify the target device’s site.
• Configuration-policy patch jobs — target devices outside the caller’s sites are rejected.
• AI tools — read/enumeration tools that lack an explicit device filter narrow their results to the caller’s in-scope devices; a technician with no in-scope devices gets empty results.
• Security threat actions — quarantine/remove/restore verify the threat’s device site before queueing.

A device outside the technician’s site allowlist is unreachable even though it belongs to the same organization.

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Agent Security

The agent runs on customer endpoints with elevated privileges. Its security is paramount.

Token and Config Security

Control	Detail
Token format	brz_ prefix tokens generated during enrollment
Token storage	SHA-256 hash in devices.agentTokenHash — plaintext never persisted
Request validation	Every REST and WebSocket request validates bearer token against stored hash
Config directory	0750 (rwxr-x—) — agent owner + group read for Helper
Config file	0640 (rw-r—–) for agent.yaml, 0600 (rw—––) for secrets.yaml — auth token isolated in root-only secrets file
Message validation	All incoming WebSocket messages validated against Zod discriminated union schema

Provisioning Credential Delivery

When a device is provisioned, the API does not return the long-lived agent secrets inline. Instead it returns a short-TTL, single-use fetch URL. The credential bundle (agent auth token, watchdog and helper tokens, mTLS private key, manifest trust keys) is retrievable exactly once: the fetch is consumed with an atomic UPDATE ... WHERE consumed_at IS NULL, and the stored plaintext is hard-deleted immediately after the first successful read. The handle expires after PROVISION_HANDLE_TTL_MINUTES (default 5 minutes); a replay returns 404, and the fetch is additionally org-access-checked as defense-in-depth on top of the token. This keeps agent secrets out of logs, command history, and any persistent at-rest store.

Mutual TLS (Optional)

For zero-trust authentication where both server and agent verify each other’s identity, Breeze integrates with Cloudflare Client Certificates API. Certificates are issued during enrollment, renewed automatically at 2/3 lifetime, and expired certificates trigger device quarantine pending admin review.

See Cloudflare mTLS for the full setup guide.

Command Execution Auditing

Mutating commands sent to agents are logged to the audit trail:

• Registry modifications (REGISTRY_DELETE, REGISTRY_KEY_DELETE)
• File operations (FILE_DELETE)
• Patch operations (PATCH_SCAN, INSTALL_PATCHES, ROLLBACK_PATCHES)

Each audit entry captures: command type, target device, exit code, stderr output, and the actor who initiated the command.

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Encryption

In Transit

Control	Implementation
TLS termination	Caddy reverse proxy with automatic Let’s Encrypt certificates
HSTS	max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
HTTP redirect	Optional FORCE_HTTPS environment variable
WebSocket	WSS (encrypted WebSocket) for all agent communication
Internal traffic	API listens on localhost only — no unencrypted external exposure

At Rest

Data	Algorithm	Details
Passwords	Argon2id	64 MB memory, 3 iterations, 4 threads, 32-byte hash
Auth tokens	SHA-256	One-way hash — tokens, API keys, session tokens, enrollment keys
Secrets	AES-256-GCM	Authenticated encryption with per-operation random IV
MFA secrets	AES-256-GCM	Encrypted before storage, decrypted only during verification

Secrets encrypted at rest use the format: enc:v1:{base64url(iv)}.{base64url(authTag)}.{base64url(ciphertext)} — 12-byte random IV generated per encryption (never reused), GCM authentication tag prevents tampering, and isEncryptedSecret() prevents double-encryption.

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Rate Limiting and Abuse Prevention

Breeze uses Redis-backed sliding window rate limiting. The implementation is fail-closed — if Redis is unavailable, requests are denied.

Endpoint	Limit	Window	Key
Login attempts	5	5 minutes	Per email
Password reset	3	1 hour	Per email
MFA verification	5	5 minutes	Per user
SMS verification	3	1 hour	Per phone
SMS login	3	5 minutes	Per email
Agent requests	120	60 seconds	Per device
API key requests	Configurable	1 hour	Per key

The implementation uses Redis sorted set (ZSET) sliding windows with MULTI pipelines for race-condition-free counting. Standard X-RateLimit-* headers and 429 Too Many Requests with Retry-After are returned when limits are exceeded.

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Input Validation

All external input is validated using Zod schemas before processing:

Input Type	Validation
Email	z.string().email()
UUIDs	z.string().uuid()
Phone numbers	E.164 regex (^\+[1-9]\d{6,14}$)
MFA codes	Exact 6-character length
Passwords	8–128 chars with complexity requirements
Pagination	min: 1, max: 100 limit enforcement
Agent messages	Zod discriminated union for WebSocket payloads
API request bodies	@hono/zod-validator middleware on every route

Validation errors return structured error objects with field paths. Sensitive values are never echoed in error responses.

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HTTP Security Headers

Every response includes the following security headers:

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
X-Content-Type-Options:    nosniff
X-Frame-Options:           DENY
Referrer-Policy:           strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Permissions-Policy:        camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Content-Security-Policy:
    default-src 'self';
    script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
    style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
    img-src 'self' data: blob:;
    font-src 'self';
    connect-src 'self' ws: wss:;
    frame-ancestors 'none';
    base-uri 'self';
    form-action 'self'

CORS

• Production: Only explicitly configured origins allowed via CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS
• No wildcards: Wildcard (*) origin is explicitly rejected in production
• Development: localhost origins only, excluded from production builds unless opted in

CSRF Protection

State-changing operations (POST, PUT, DELETE) on sensitive endpoints require a x-breeze-csrf header. Requests without the header return 403.

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Audit Logging

Every security-relevant operation is recorded in the audit_logs table:

Field	Description
actorType	user, api_key, agent, or system
actorId	UUID of the actor
action	Specific operation (e.g., device.command.execute)
resourceType	Target entity type
resourceId	Target entity UUID
result	success, failure, or denied
ipAddress	Source IP (IPv4/IPv6)
userAgent	Client identifier
details	JSONB metadata (command type, exit codes, etc.)
errorMessage	Failure reason (if applicable)

Retention

• Default: 365 days per organization
• Configurable: Per-org retention policies via audit_retention_policies
• Archival: Optional S3 archival before deletion

Logging Modes

• Synchronous: createAuditLog() — blocks until written (critical operations)
• Asynchronous: createAuditLogAsync() — fire-and-forget (non-critical operations)

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AI Risk Classification

The AI system has access to powerful tools. Every AI-initiated action passes through a risk classification engine enforced by the RMM, not the AI.

Risk Level	Behavior	Examples
Low	Auto-execute, logged	Query devices, read logs, generate reports
Medium	Execute + notify technician	Read-only scripts, pre-approved patch deployments
High	Requires human approval	State-changing scripts, patches outside maintenance windows
Critical	Blocked entirely	Device wipe, bulk destructive operations

• Risk policies are configurable per partner, organization, site, or device group
• The AI cannot bypass the risk engine — it is enforced at the tool execution layer
• BYOK mode: your API key, your data, your infrastructure — nothing sent to LanternOps unless you opt in

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Infrastructure Security

Docker Hardening

Control	Implementation
Base image	node:24-alpine (current LTS, minimal attack surface)
Multi-stage build	deps → builder → runner (no build tools in production)
Non-root execution	Dedicated hono user (UID 1001), nodejs group (GID 1001)
File ownership	--chown=hono:nodejs on all copied assets
Minimal exposure	Single port (3001) exposed

TLS Termination

Caddy reverse proxy handles TLS termination with automatic Let’s Encrypt certificate provisioning (ACME), HSTS with preload, zstd and gzip compression, and separate routing for /api/*, /metrics/*, and frontend assets.

Environment Isolation

• API server listens on localhost — never directly exposed
• Database and Redis accessible only within the Docker network
• Metrics endpoint (/metrics/*) separated from public routes

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Supply Chain Security

Automated Scanning

Scanner	What It Checks	Trigger
CodeQL	Static analysis (SAST) for JS/TS vulnerabilities	Every push and PR to main
Gitleaks	Hardcoded secrets in source code	Every push and PR to main
npm audit	Node.js dependency vulnerabilities (high+)	Every push and PR to main + weekly
govulncheck	Go dependency vulnerabilities	Every push and PR to main + weekly
Trivy	Filesystem CVE scan (high + critical)	Every push and PR to main + weekly

All scanners run in CI and block merges on failure.

Dependency Management

• Lock file: pnpm-lock.yaml committed for reproducible builds
• Package manager: pnpm with strict dependency resolution
• Version pinning: All dependencies pinned to exact versions via lock file

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Secret Management

Required Secrets

Secret	Purpose	Minimum Strength
JWT_SECRET	Token signing	32+ characters
APP_ENCRYPTION_KEY	AES-256-GCM encryption	32-byte hex
MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY	MFA secret encryption	32-byte hex
AGENT_ENROLLMENT_SECRET	Agent enrollment	32-byte hex
REDIS_PASSWORD	Redis authentication (must appear in REDIS_URL)	32-byte hex
RELEASE_ARTIFACT_MANIFEST_PUBLIC_KEYS	Verifies signed release manifests in GitHub-mode binary distribution	Base64 SPKI
IS_HOSTED	Deployment mode flag (true/false); gates signup, billing, and email-verification policy	Explicit boolean

Production Enforcement

Breeze validates environment configuration on startup:

• Rejects 24 known placeholder/default values
• Requires explicit CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS (no wildcards)
• Enforces minimum secret strength
• Logs warnings for non-critical misconfigurations

Secrets Never Stored in Plaintext

Secret	Protection
User passwords	Argon2id
Session tokens	SHA-256
API keys	SHA-256
Agent auth tokens	SHA-256
Enrollment keys	SHA-256 with pepper
MFA secrets	AES-256-GCM

For rotation procedures and schedules, see Secret Rotation.

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Operational Security

Backup and Recovery

• RTO: < 1 hour
• RPO: < 15 minutes (with WAL archiving) or last backup interval
• Components: PostgreSQL, object storage (MinIO/S3), encrypted configuration

For full procedures, see Backup and Restore.

Error Handling

• Generic error messages returned to clients — internal details never exposed
• No stack traces in production responses
• Structured JSON logging (LOG_JSON=true) for log aggregation
• Optional Sentry integration for error tracking (SENTRY_DSN)
• Sensitive data (tokens, passwords) never logged

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SOC 2 Alignment

Breeze’s security controls align with SOC 2 Trust Service Criteria.

CC6 — Logical and Physical Access Controls

Criteria	Implementation
CC6.1 — Logical access security	JWT + MFA + RBAC + API key scoping
CC6.2 — Credentials management	Argon2id passwords, SHA-256 token hashing, AES-256-GCM secrets
CC6.3 — Access authorization	Role-based permissions, scope enforcement, requirePermission() middleware
CC6.6 — External access restrictions	CORS allowlist, CSP, rate limiting, CSRF protection
CC6.7 — Data transmission security	TLS 1.2+, HSTS preload, WSS for agent communication
CC6.8 — Unauthorized access prevention	Fail-closed rate limiting, device quarantine, session invalidation

CC7 — System Operations

Criteria	Implementation
CC7.1 — Infrastructure monitoring	Agent health checks, heartbeat monitoring, configurable alerting
CC7.2 — Anomaly detection	Rate limit violation tracking, audit log analysis
CC7.3 — Vulnerability management	CodeQL SAST, Trivy CVE scanning, npm audit, govulncheck
CC7.4 — Incident response	Disaster recovery runbook, security incident procedures

CC8 — Change Management

Criteria	Implementation
CC8.1 — Change authorization	PR-based workflow, CI gate enforcement, code review requirements

CC9 — Risk Mitigation

Criteria	Implementation
CC9.1 — Risk identification	Automated security scanning (5 scanners), AI risk classification engine
CC9.2 — Vendor risk management	Dependency lock files, supply chain scanning, known vulnerability databases

A1 — Availability

Criteria	Implementation
A1.1 — Processing capacity	Redis-backed rate limiting, BullMQ queue management
A1.2 — Recovery objectives	RTO < 1 hour, RPO < 15 minutes
A1.3 — Recovery testing	Documented procedures for 5 failure scenarios

C1 — Confidentiality

Criteria	Implementation
C1.1 — Confidential data identification	Multi-tenant isolation, encryption key hierarchy
C1.2 — Confidential data disposal	Audit log retention policies, S3 archival, configurable retention

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Vulnerability Disclosure

We follow coordinated disclosure:

• Response timelines: 48-hour acknowledgment, severity-based fix targets
• Email: security@lanternops.io

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Security Controls Summary

Domain	Controls	Status
Authentication	JWT + MFA (TOTP/SMS/Passkey) + Sessions + API Keys	Implemented
Authorization	RBAC + scope-based multi-tenancy + app-layer site-scope	Implemented
Encryption (at rest)	AES-256-GCM, Argon2id, SHA-256	Implemented
Encryption (in transit)	TLS 1.2+ / HSTS / WSS	Implemented
Rate limiting	Redis sliding window (fail-closed)	Implemented
Audit logging	Structured, org-scoped, async-capable	Implemented
Input validation	Zod schemas on all external input	Implemented
Security headers	CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, Permissions-Policy	Implemented
CORS	Strict allowlist, no production wildcards	Implemented
CSRF protection	Header-based validation on state changes	Implemented
Agent security	Token hashing + optional mTLS + file permissions	Implemented
AI safety	Risk classification engine with human approval gates	Implemented
Supply chain	5 automated scanners blocking on failure	Implemented
Docker hardening	Multi-stage, non-root, Alpine base	Implemented
Secret management	Rotation procedures, production validation, no plaintext	Implemented
Disaster recovery	Documented runbooks, defined RTO/RPO	Implemented